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Admitting the Problem with the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
By: Andrew Tobel1

Introduction
Health care reform is quickly changing the health care landscape. Over sixty-five
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) have taken effect since it
became law on March 23, 2010, with another fifteen to take effect in 2014.2 The PPACA
represents the biggest legislative reform to take place since enactment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs in 1965. The impact of some provisions has been more dramatic than
anticipated. Hospitals argue that the “Hospital Readmission Reduction Program” (HRRP), which
was implemented last year, is on the top of their list.3 This provision hits hospitals where it really
hurts: their wallet.
Under the HRRP a hospital’s Medicare reimbursements are reduced when a hospital
experiences excess readmission rates for certain health conditions denominated by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS).4 Hospitals, professional practitioners, and academics have
criticized the the HRRP. Some argue that the HRRP unjustly places all the blame for excessive
costs, presumably due to lack of quality care, on hospitals.5 Hospitals assert that other providers
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must also provide quality health care post-discharge to reduce readmission rates and to keep
costs down.6
Part I of this Note introduces Medicare and its reimbursement mechanisms, showing how
such mechanisms affect provider behavior, thereby contributing to high or unconstrained
spending. Part II of this Note discusses concerns about Medicare spending and Congress’s
solution to the costs of the Medicare program. Specifically, Part II discusses the HRRP, the
methodology used to calculate HRRP reimbursement reduction penalty, and New Jersey’s
readmission rate problem. Part III of this Note looks at the economics of the HRRP, surveys how
hospitals are responding, and discusses the practices New Jersey hospitals are implementing to
reduce readmissions. Lastly, this Note concludes by discussing how the HRRP should be
changed by redefining the Risk Adjustment Factor or converting to a peer review standard, rather
than a national standard, to determine the reimbursement reduction penalty.
I.

Part I
Medicare was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act as a

public health insurance program.7 Medicare consists of four parts. Individuals qualify for Part A
if they are sixty-five years and over, have worked for forty quarters in Medicare covered
employment and are U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents, regardless of medical history,
preexisting conditions, assets, or income.8 Under limited circumstances an individual under
sixty-five may qualify for Medicare Part A.9
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Telephone Interview with Eileen Clifford, M.D., Medical Director of Care Management, Saint Joseph’s Medical
Regional Medical Center (Nov. 4, 2013).
7
Medicare: A Primer, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 1 (2010), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7615-03.pdf.
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Id. at 2.
9
Persons under age 65 who have a permanent disability, end-stage renal disease (ESRD), or Lou Gehrig’s disease
(ALS) are also eligible for Medicare benefits, with certain illness specific benefit restrictions. A person with a

A qualified beneficiary under Medicare Part A receives coverage for hospital care, skilled
nursing facility care, non-custodial nursing home care, hospice, and home health services.10 In
2011 Medicare spent $552 billion on health care of which over $139.7 billion was spent on
inpatient hospital stays.11 Medicare Part A is federally funded through payroll taxes, income
taxes on social security benefits, and premiums.12 However, even with all these sources,
Medicare funding is precarious for two reasons.
First, when Medicare was enacted there were four workers paying into the system for
every retiree.13 In 2010, that ratio dropped to 2.9 to 1.14 By 2030, it is expected that only 2.3
people will be paying into public insurance programs for every beneficiary. 15 Second, Medicare
spending continues to grow at a rate greater than inflation.16
Medicare already accounts for over 15 percent of federal spending. 17 The rise in
Medicare spending will continue to put a strain on the federal budget.18 It is estimated that at the
current spending rate Medicare will become insolvent by 2026.19

permanent disability must wait 24 months after receiving Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) until they
qualify for receiving Medicare Benefits, notwithstanding failure to make payroll tax contributions for forty quarters.
However, individuals with ESRD or ALS may begin receiving Medicare benefits as soon as they receive SSDI
payments. Id.
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Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: A Date Book: Health Care Spending and the
Medicare Program 3-5 (2013), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun13DataBookEntireReport.pdf.
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How is Medicare funded?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicare.gov/about-us/howmedicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
13
Frequently Asked Questions: Ratio of Covered Workers to Beneficiaries, SSA.GOV
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ratios.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
14
Id.
15
Avik Roy, Saving Medicare from Itself, 8 NAT’L AFF. 35, 35 (2011).
16
Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Medicare’s Rising Costs—and the Urgent Need for Reform, 2779 THE
BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 22, 2013); Roy, supra note 15, at 35.
17
Moffit & Senger, supra note 16, at 2.
18
Report to Congress: Reforming the Delivery System: Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 3 (2008) (statement of Mark
Miller, Executive Director Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) [hereinafter Miller Report].
19
Brett Norman, Medicare Exhausted in 2026, Trustees Say, POLITICO (May 31, 2013 11:10 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/medicare-exhausted-2026-trustees-92066.html.

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independent
Congressional federal body that advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare.20 In order to
prevent insolvency, MedPAC has been determining how to reduce costs.21 MedPAC’s 2007
annual report made several suggestions on how to increase efficiency and decreases costs to help
reduce Medicare spending.22
For example, MedPAC has recommended that reducing hospital in-patient readmissions
can reduce Medicare spending.23 Consequently, the HRRP was enacted as part of the PPACA.24
This provision has a large impact on hospitals.25 How hospitals receive funding under the
Medicare Payment system must be reviewed to understand why the HRRP has such great
consequences.
a. Medicare Payment Systems
Medicare is a major source of hospital revenues.26 Under Medicare Part A, a hospital is
reimbursed for Medicare beneficiaries admitted on an inpatient basis for medically necessary
treatment.27 Hospitals receive reimbursement for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries
under a Prospective Payment System (PPS).28 Payments are only made for the amount that

20

Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Promoting Greater Efficiency in Medicare ii
(2007), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter MedPAC 2007
Report].
21
See Id. at 103-05.
22
Miller Report , supra note 18, at 4-7.
23
See MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103-05.
24
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
25
Id.
26
Symposium, Hospital Cost Containment in Iowa: A Guide for State Public Policymakers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1263,
1291 (1984).
27
42 U.S.C. 1395f (2012); 1869 AM. JUR. 2D Soc. Security and Medicare § 1927 (2014).
28
Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ProspMedicareFeeSvcPmtGen/index.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).

reflects the reasonable cost of providing such treatment.29 The payments are determined by
diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment schedules.30 A DRG accounts for the “principal
diagnosis, complicating or comorbid conditions, surgical procedures, age/sex and discharge
status.”31 Thus, in a very generalized way, hospitals are not reimbursed for the actual cost of a
patient’s care, but rather for what it should have cost to care for the patient based upon the
assigned DRG.32 Consequently, the hospital loses money if the cost of the actual length of the
patient’s stay, or quantity of services ordered by the physician, exceeds what Medicare
reimburses for that specific DRG code. Thus, under the PPS system, hospitals focus on
“maximizing the overall profit from each Medicare patient” by discharging patients as quickly as
possible.33
Medicare pays doctors, on the other hand, on a fee-for-service (FFS) payment system.
Under this system doctors receive funds under a “comprehensive listing of fee maximums”
which “is used to reimburse a physician and/or other providers” based on the services provided.34
Unlike hospitals, doctors are not paid based on the value of the service provided but rather on the
volume of service provided.35 “The traditional program’s fee-for-service payment system …
encourages an increase in the volume of services requested, which encourages excessive

29

Medically necessity is determined by a peer review organization that independently oversees each hospital. 1869
AM. JUR. 2D Soc. Security and Medicare § 1927 (2012).
30
42 C.F.R. 412.60 et seq. (2012).
31
Glossary of Terms, STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (1998),
http://med.stanford.edu/shs/update/archives/feb98/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
32
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HOW DRG
RATES ARE CALCULATED AND UPDATED (2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf.
33
RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S HEALTH
CARE 48 (2006).
34
Fee Schedules - General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/FeeScheduleGenInfo/index.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013).
35
Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Medicare’s Rising Costs—and the Urgent Need for Reform, 2779 THE
BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 22, 2013);

spending.”36 Therefore, the reimbursement mechanisms for hospitals and doctors are misaligned
– the system financially penalizes hospitals but rewards physicians for the provisions of
excessive services.37
For this reason, Medicare’s spending continues to increase not only because of the rise in
health care costs but largely because of the rise in number of services provided.38 In fact, a 2007
study by the Congressional Budget Office determined that fees paid by Medicare Part B
decreased, as a result of the Sustainable Growth Rate, but that the total cost of services paid by
the program increased 34.5 percent.39 This demonstrates that doctors have been increasing the
volume of services provided.
A tension exists between hospitals and doctors because of the difference in pay systems.
Hospitals know the amount of reimbursement they will receive based on the DRG assigned.
Therefore hospitals want to discharge Medicare beneficiaries before the cost of treatment is
greater than the DRG reimbursement. However, doctors are incentivized to keep patients and
provide more “services” because they are paid under a FFS system.
Some hospitals have dealt with this issue through controversial economic credentialing,
whereby physicians’ practice patterns are taken into account when they seek reappointment to
the medical staff.40 Some hospitals attempted to engage in profit-sharing with physicians, which
the IRS quickly declared illegal for tax-exempt hospitals, as private inurement, and HHS deemed
to constitute illegal remuneration under the anti-kickback statutes.41

36

Id.
Avik Roy, Saving Medicare from Itself, 8 NAT’L AFF. 35, 42 (2011).
38
See Id. at 41.
39
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 2597, FACTORS UNDERLYING THE GROWTH IN MEDICARE’S SPENDING
FOR PHYSICIANS’ SERVICES 2 (2007).
40
See generally Mark L. Mattioli, ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING, CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST POLICIES, AND HOSPITALPHYSICIAN COMPETITION: ANTITRUST ISSUES AND PITFALLS (2009) (discussing how hospitals view economic
credentialling as necessary to stay competitive).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2012); 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2012).
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More current schemes involve gainsharing with physicians, an arrangement where
hospital gives physicians a percentage of any reduction in the hospital’s costs for patient care
which can be attributed to the efforts of the physician.42 The HHS has been suspicion of these
programs as well.43 While the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has approved some
gainsharing programs, the analysis of each program is highly fact-specific.44 The OIG believes
that some programs may reduce access to services or new technology.45 Hospitals are faced with
civil monetary penalties for schemes that encourage reduction in care provided to a patient.46
Therefore, hospitals have few legal means to encourage changes in physician practice
patterns that are not to their financial advantage. Regardless of how hospitals have developed
physician cooperation, the end game is the same; hospitals seek to discharge patients as soon as
possible so that the cost of care is below the DRG reimbursement.
Part of the PPACA’s purpose was to address this realignment, and eliminate the financial
incentives which perversely increase the cost of care. This was done by replacing past payment
structures with financial incentives and penalties that reward quality care. For example, global
payments, whereby all providers in the continuum of care will have to work together to provide
patients with quality care in the most cost-efficient manner, is one way to transition away from
FFS payments.47 The purpose behind these programs or new payment schedules is to reduce

42

Gainsharing, AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/Gainsharing.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
43
The Office of the Inspector General has exercised caution on whether to impose Civil Monetary Penalties for such
programs. Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Michael Chernew & Dana Goldman, Proposal 1: Transitioning to Bundled Payments in Medicare , in 15 WAYS
TO RETHINK THE FEDERAL BUDGET 12 (Michael Greenstone et al. eds., 2013)

costs. Through these bundle payment programs, provider systems are presented with new
opportunities to develop systematic processes that help to avoid and reduce readmissions.48
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been serially focusing on
specific practice patterns that are perceived to be particular culprits of unnecessarily high costs.
CMS is concerned with readmissions because the DRG payment system encourages hospitals to
discharge patients prematurely, as discuss above.49 Under the old DRG payment system,
hospitals are paid on a per admission basis.50 Therefore, hospitals had no incentive to reduce
readmissions.51 In fact, a hospital that is not at full capacity has an incentive not to reduce
readmissions because a new patient coming through the door means an increased stream of
revenue.52 The HRRP seeks to encourage hospitals to reduce readmissions or face a penalty.53
MedPAC believes that preventing one out of every ten readmissions would save over one billion
dollars annually.54
II.

PART II
In 2007, MedPAC issued a report to Congress outlining how avoidable readmissions

were adversely affecting the Medicare Program.55 The report noted that nearly 20 percent of
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Berenson, supra note 5, at 9-10.
Becky S. Cornett, Managing Hospital Readmissions: An Overview of the Issues, 13 J. OF HEALTH CARE COMP. 5,
12 (2011)002E
50
Id. at 13.
51
See MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 105; Jordan Rau, Medicare To Penalize 2,217 Hospitals For Excess
Readmissions, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/august/13/medicare-hospitals-readmissions-penalties.aspx.
52
Robert Berenson et al., Medicare’s Readmissions-Reduction Program — A Positive Alternative, 366 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 1364, 1364 (2012).
53
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
54
Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Refining the Hospital Readmissions Reduction
Program 96 (2013), available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Jun13_Ch04.pdf [hereinafter MedPAC 2013
Report].
55
MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103.
49

Medicare patients are readmitted within a month of their initial discharge.56 These readmissions
account for over $17 billion in Medicare spending annually.57 In an effort to curtail this
ostensibly preventable spending, MedPAC recommended that Congress adopt a two-part policy
to reduce Medicare spending attributable to hospital readmissions.58
First, MedPAC proposed that Congress require hospitals to report “hospital-specific
readmission rates for a subset of conditions.”59 There are many instances in which quantifying a
behavior can contribute to changing that behavior, especially where the opportunity exists for
comparative analysis.60 Congress codified this recommendation,61 and these reports are now
available for every hospital covered by the HRRP at CMS’s Hospital Compare website. 62
MedPAC expects providers to use this information “to adjust their practice styles and coordinate
care to reduce service use.”63
Second, MedPAC proposed that Congress adjust the underlying payment method to
financially encourage hospitals to reduce readmission rates.64 The suggestion was that a
proposed penalty scheme would reduce payments for hospitals that had “high readmissions
rate[s] for select conditions.”65
In 2008 the Executive Director of MedPAC addressed the Senate Committee on Finance
noting that Medicare’s FFS payment system “reward(s) providers who increase the volume of
56

Jordan Rau, Medicare To Penalize 2,217 Hospitals For Excess Readmissions, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13,
2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/august/13/medicare-hospitals-readmissions-penalties.aspx.
57
Robert Berenson et al., Medicare’s Readmissions-Reduction Program — A Positive Alternative, 366 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 1364, 1364 (2012).
58
MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103.
59
MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103.
60
E.g., MAYES, supra note 33, at 48-53 (discussing the increased competition between hospitals as a result of the
implementation of PPS system which lead to reduced costs).
61
42 U.S.C. §1395ww(q)(6) (2012).
62
Id.; See Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: Overview, QUALITYNET
http://qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetTier2&cid=1228772412
458 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
63
Miller Report , supra note 18, at 13.
64
MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103-04.
65
Miller Report , supra note 18, at 14.

services they provide regardless of the benefit of the service.”66 These statements in conjunction
with MedPAC’s 2007 report sufficiently highlighted the negative effects that hospital
readmissions have on the quality and cost of health care. Congress reacted by adding the
“Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program” to the PPACA.67
a. Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
There is a heavy cost for excessive readmissions rates under the HRRP.68 The HRRP
adjusts the Medicare payments (a.k.a. Total Base Operating DRG Payment) a hospital receives
through the inpatient prospective payment system when readmission rates are higher than
expected.69 The penalties are based on the readmissions rates for Medicare patients who are
readmitted into a hospital with one of three diagnoses.70 Currently, those three conditions are
pneumonia (PN), acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and heart failure (HF). 71 The statute defines
a “readmission” as a patient that returns to any hospital within thirty days of a discharge who is
readmitted as an inpatient.72 However, readmissions “that are unrelated to the prior discharge
(such as a planned readmission or transfer to another applicable hospital),” are not considered
readmission for the purpose of calculating the readmission rate.73

66

Id. at 4.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
68
See Rau, supra note 3.
69
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2012).
70
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(A)(i) (2012).
71
Readmissions Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-ReductionProgram.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). To be selected as an applicable condition must be a condition or procedure
“for which (1) readmissions are ‘high volume or high expenditure’; and (2) ‘measures of such readmissions’ have
been endorsed by the entity with a contract under section 1890(a) of the Act (currently [the National Quality
Forum]) and (3) such endorsed measures have exclusions for readmissions that are unrelated to the prior discharge
(such as a planned readmission or transfer to another applicable hospital).” 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51665 (Aug. 18,
2011).
72
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(E) (2012).
73
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(A)(ii)(II) (2012).
67

The HHS selected the three current applicable conditions for two reasons. First,
according to CMS, the three diagnoses are the most common ailments among Medicare
beneficiaries.74 Reducing readmissions for these patients will create the greatest decrease in costs
because these conditions are the most common. Second, these three conditions were extensively
reported on from 2009 to 2012 to the Medicare Hospital Compare website.75 CMS believes that
the extensive reporting allowed hospitals adequate time to implement systems to reduce
readmission rates.76
b. Methodology
It is important to understand the methodology for how CMS calculates the Total Base
Operating DRG Payment, Readmission Adjustment Factor and Excess Readmission Ratio.

77

This section first analyzes how the HRRP adjustment factor affects the Base Operating DRG
Payment a hospital receives and the results from the first two years of experience with the HRRP
program. Subsequent sections will further analyze how the Readmission Adjustment Factor, its
component parts, and the Excess Readmission Ratio are calculated. Through an understanding of
this methodology, it becomes apparent how the government’s policy goals are accomplished.
Specifically, how the adopted risk adjustment methodology has a large impact on the overall
Readmission Payment Adjustment.
i.
74

Calculating Total Base Operating DRG Payment

Cornett, supra note 49, at 5.
MedPAC 2013 Report, supra note 54, at 97. Specifically the CMS “[e]stablished an applicable period of three
years of discharge data and the use of a minimum of 25 cases to calculate a hospital’s excess readmission ratio of
each applicable condition.” Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71.
76
See 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51664 (Aug. 18, 2011).
77
“DRG payments” are the IPPS payments a hospital would receive minus disproportionate share hospital
payments, Indirect Medical Education, and outlier payments. This note ignores other DRG Payment calculation
factors for simplicity and only assesses DRG Payments made for discharges. See Nikhil Sahni et al., Will The
Readmission Rate Penalties Drive Hospital Behavior Changes?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/14/will-the-readmission-rate-penalties-drive-hospital-behavior-changes/.
75

Before the HRRP was enacted, hospitals received payments for all discharges based on
reported DRGs.78 Now the HRRP affects the Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital
receives through a penalty, the Readmissions Payment Adjustment.79 CMS applies a
Readmission Payment Adjustment to hospitals that exhibit excessive readmissions rates for
applicable conditions.80 The fine takes the shape of a percent reduction in reimbursement – it
changes each year.81
The Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital receives under the HRRP is equal to
the product of the Base Operating DRG Payment Amount and the Readmission Adjustment
Factor.82 Even though CMS limits its analysis of actual readmission rates to the three applicable
conditions, it assesses the penalty to all DRG Payments.83 The reductions differ from hospital to
hospital because each hospital’s Readmission Adjustment Factor is different.84
ii.

Calculating the Readmission Adjustment Factor

The Readmission “[A]djustment [F]actor . . . is equal to the greater of . . . the [R]atio . . .
or the [F]loor [A]djustment [F]actor” for the given year.85 The Ratio is equal to one minus the
Aggregate Payments for Excess Readmissions and the Aggregate Payments for all Discharges.86

78

See Jane Hyatt Thorpe & Teresa Cascio, Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Nov.
1, 2011), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/hospital-readmissions-reduction-program/.
79
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
80
Rau, supra note 3.
81
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(i)-(iii) (2012).
82
Mathematically represented as follows: Payment = Base Operating DRG Payment Amount * Readmissions
Payment Adjustment Factor). 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1).
83
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1) (2012); See Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71.
84
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(A) (2012).
85
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)((3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012).
86
Aggregate Payments for Excess Readmissions is defined as “for a hospital . . . for applicable conditions . . . of the
product of the base operating DRG payment . . . and the number of admissions … and the excess readmissions ratio
minus one,” for each applicable condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(A) (i)-(iii) (2012). Mathematically
represented as follows: Aggregate payments for excess readmissions = [sum of base operating DRG payments for
AMI x (excess readmission ratio for AMI-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for HF x (excess readmission
ratio for HF-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for PN x (excess readmission ratio for PN-1)].
Readmission Reductions Program, supra note 71. Aggregate Payment for all Discharges means “the sum of the base

As defined, the Ratio is capped by the statute. Therefore, for fiscal year 2012, the maximum
penalty a hospital could be assessed was one percent of its Medicare DRG Payment, i.e. an
adjustment factor of .99.87 This means a hospital only received 99 percent of its Medicare DRG
payments. If the Ratio, for fiscal year 2012, was greater than the .99 floor adjustment factor, then
a penalty of less than 1 percent would be applied. For fiscal year 2013 and 2014 this penalty will
increase to 2 and 3 percent, respectively.88
Over 2,225 hospitals received a reimbursement reduction for the 2012 fiscal year. 89 This
totaled $280 million in penalties that Medicare collected from hospitals with excessive
readmission rates.90 It is expected that Medicare will collect $227 million for the 2013 fiscal
year, when the penalty cap increases to two percent.91
iii.

Calculating Excess Readmission Ratio

The Excessive Readmission Ratio, a key component to determine the Aggregate Payment
for Excess Readmission, is defined as “the ratio (but not less than 1.0) of . . . the risk adjusted
readmissions based on actual readmissions . . . to the risk adjusted expected readmissions.”92
The most important language in this statute is that the PPACA does allow for risk
adjustments for factors affecting a hospital’s readmission and expected readmission rate.93 CMS

operating DRG payment amounts for all discharges for all conditions from such hospital for such applicable period.”
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(B). 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). Therefore the Ratio is mathematically
represented as follow:
. Readmissions Reduction Program, supra
note 71.
87
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(i)-(iii) (2012).
88
Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71.
89
Rau, supra note 3.
90
Rau, supra note 56.
91
Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov.
12, 2013), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_102.pdf.
92
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(C)(i)(I)-(II) (2012). Mathematically, the excess readmission ratio is expressed as
. Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71.

asserts that the risk adjustment performed “‘levels the playing field’ for comparing hospital
performance.”94 The risk adjustment factors for each hospital’s expected readmission rate
currently include patient demographic characteristics, comorbidities, and patient frailty. 95 This
final rate is called the Risk Adjusted Expected Readmission Rate.96 In simplistic terms, this
means that the Risk Adjusted Expected Readmission Rate is the average rate of hospitals with
the same patient mix, where patient mix is determined by age, comorbidity, and patient frailty.
iv.

Policy decisions for Risk Adjustment

How readmissions and expected readmissions are risk adjusted has a large impact on the
Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital receives. The methodology for determining risk
adjustment for these figures presents a key opportunity to implement government policy.97 The
National Quality Forum (NQF) is “a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public service organization” that
“reviews, endorses, and recommends use of standardized healthcare performance measures.”98
CMS adopted and finalized the NQF’s proposed risk-adjustment methodology in its FY 2012
IPPS Final Rule.99
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However, many commenters to the final rule argue that the risk adjustment that was
proposed, and subsequently adopted, is insufficient.100 Commenters suggest that the risk
adjustment needs to include “patient race, language, life circumstances, environmental factors,
and socioeconomic status” to truly level the playing field.101 Critics are concerned that the HRRP
will “disproportionately affect hospitals serving a large number of minorities,” and thus “by
penalizing these hospitals, the program” will disproportionately harm minority patients.102
CMS does not believe that the adopted risk adjustments harm minorities.103 CMS asserts
that the risk adjustments “are risk-standardized readmission measure[s] that adjust . . . age, sex,
comorbid disease and indicators of patient frailty” that have a “strong relationship[] with the
outcome.”104 CMS believes that other factors, such as race, socioeconomic status, and English
language proficiency are not appropriate to capture in the Risk Adjustment Factor.105 Critics of
the current risk adjustment assert that socioeconomic status affects readmission rates because
low-income patients lack access to primary care physicians, post-discharge medication and
transportation for follow-up appointments.106 CMS counters that the “association between such
patient factors and health outcomes” is due to "differences in the quality of health care received”
and that “better quality of care is achievable regardless” of such factors.107
Relatedly, other critics assert that the current risk adjustment structure is insufficient in
regard to safety net hospitals.108 Commenters believe such categories of hospitals are at an
increased risk of receiving penalties under the HRRP because “their patients are sicker, lack
100
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access to appropriate post-discharge care, may suffer numerous chronic conditions, and may
have substance abuse or behavioral problems.”109 This proposition is supported by Kaiser Health
News’ analysis of the penalties assessed in the first year of the HRRP.110 Kaiser Health News
separated hospitals into four groups based on a CMS index which determines whether a hospital
“deserves extra payments for treating large numbers of low-income patients.”111 Over 12 percent
of hospitals in the group with the most low-income patients received the maximum penalty for
excess readmissions compared to only 7 percent of hospitals in the group that treat the fewest
poor patients.112 Kaiser Health News’ found that safety net hospitals were more likely to receive
a penalty of any size than non-safety net hospitals.113 During the HRRP’s second year of
penalties Kaiser Health News’ analysis revealed that over 77 percent of safety net hospitals were
penalized compared to only 36 percent of hospitals treating the fewest poor patients.114 Critics of
the current risk adjustment assert that socioeconomic status effect readmission rates because lowincome patients lack access to primary care physicians, post-discharge medication and
transportation for follow-up appointments.115
However, CMS does not accept that the HRRP’s current risk adjustment methodology
has a disparate impact on safety net hospitals.116 CMS suggests that many safety net hospitals
perform as well on readmission measures as non-safety net hospitals that have fewer at-risk
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patients.117 For example, Denver Health Medical Center (Denver Health), a safety net hospital,
has historically had low readmission rates.118
Denver Health has been able to obtain such low readmission rates because of its highly
integrated system; which includes eight community primary care clinics.119 Further, Denver
Health operates at extremely tight margins and is usually at full capacity, creating strong
financial incentives to keep readmissions low.120 Lastly, Denver Health was an early adopter of
electronic medical records which allows it to easily coordinate care post-discharge.121 Essentially
Denver Health had already positioned itself to meet HRRP requirements “through its own
network of family health centers and clinics in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods;”
something that many safety net hospitals cannot easily replicate.122
CMS asserts that the current risk adjustment measure accounts for the likelihood that
certain patient groups have a greater disease burden because of their race and/or socioeconomic
status. Therefore, CMS affirmatively refuses to risk adjust for race and socioeconomic status.
CMS believes doing so would essentially “hold hospitals to different standards for the outcomes
of their patients of low socioeconomic status.”123 CMS also believes that allowing risk
adjustment for race and socioeconomic status could “mask potential disparities or minimize
incentives to improve the outcomes of disadvantaged populations.”124 Despite the suggested
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insufficient nature of the risk adjustment factors, CMS adopted the proposed NQF risk adjusted
methodology which only takes age, comorbidity, and patient frailty into account.125
c. New Jersey’s Readmission Rates Problem
New Jersey hospitals are experiencing some of the largest fines HRRP penalties. New
Jersey has a wide variation of readmission rates – 15.8 percent to 25 percent of patients are
readmitted within thirty days.126 In fact, only two hospitals avoided fines in 2013 and only five
are expected to have improved enough to incur no fine in 2014.127 That means that 92 percent of
hospitals in New Jersey are being assessed fines.
In fact, the average New Jersey hospital was hit with a .66 percent adjustment factor. 128
This is tied for the third worst average penalty by state.129 The story gets worse from there. A
statistically higher percentage of New Jersey hospitals were hit with the maximum penalty in
fiscal year 2013 when compared to other states.130
CMS estimated that only 8.8 percent of hospitals nationally would receive the maximum
penalty.131 However, in New Jersey, twenty-two out of sixty-four, or 34.375 percent of hospitals,
experienced the maximum penalty in 2013.132 Whereas the next worst state, Kentucky, only
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26.15 percent of hospitals received the maximum penalty.133 While only one hospital is expected
to incur the 2 percent maximum fine in New Jersey in 2014, over thirteen hospitals will see their
Medicare payment adjusted by greater than 1 percent.134 Interestingly, these higher fines
happened even after New Jersey had already reduced its readmission rates by 7.5 percent
statewide from 2010 to 2012.135
New Jersey’s difficulty in controlling readmission rates is partly attributable to the nature
of the populations its hospitals serve. New Jersey’s many safety net hospitals provide a
significant level of care to low-income, uninsured, and vulnerable populations.136 In 2012, New
Jersey’s unemployment rate was 9.5 percent, which is the nation’s forty-seventh worst
unemployment rate.137 Statistically, hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients
are more likely to face penalties under the HRRP.138 Because New Jersey’s unemployment
numbers are so high, safety net hospitals are having to provide care to a greater number of lowincome, uninsured, or underinsured patients.
Nationally, a safety net hospital is 30 percent more likely to have readmission rates above
the national average and thus receive a penalty.139 In fact, 77 percent of safety net hospitals
received penalties under the HRRP compared to only 36 percent of hospitals that serve the
133

Readmissions Penalties by State: Year Two, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 02, 2013),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2013/August/02/readmission-penalties-by-state-year-two.aspx (analyzing
data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).
134
Medicare Readmission Penalties by Hospital (Year 2), supra note 132.
135
A study by the Healthcare Quality Strategies of East Brunswick, which was hired by the federal government
specifically to help reduce readmissions in New Jersey, found that from 2010 to 2012 readmission rates were
reduced from 21.6 to 19.98 (a 7.5 percent decrease). Susan K. Livio, N.J. hospital readmission rate is down about 8
percent among Medicare patients, NJ.COM (June 13, 2013 at 6:26 AM),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/06/nj_hospital_readmissions_are_down_about_8_percent_among_medic
are_patients.html.
136
What is a Safety Net Hospital?, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS,
http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/About-NAPH/About-Our-Members/what-is-a-safety-net-hospital.aspx
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
137
Unemployment Rates for States, BUREAU OF LAB. & STATS. (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/lau/lastrk12.htm.
138
Rau, supra note 3.
139
Berenson, supra note 5, at 1.

fewest poor patients.140 Safety net hospitals are in precarious financial positions before they
received penalties.141 As a result of the disproportionate application of the HRRP penalty, safetynet hospitals will receive fewer funds to attempt to reduce readmissions, thus compounding the
problem.
Low-income patients are more likely to be readmitted for a variety of reasons. First, lowincome patients have “higher rates of chronic health problems, disability, mental illness, and
substance abuse, compared with the general population.”142 None of these factors are captured in
CMS’s “risk-adjusted” rate. 143 Current only patient demographic characteristics, comorbidities,
and patient frailty are considered.144 While CMS asserts that the current risk adjustment “levels
the playing field” it does not do enough. CMS admits that the risk adjustment does not adjust for
race, English proficiency or SES.145
Second, many low-income patients face adverse social factors such as homelessness,
unsafe housing, and unstable employment.146 This can result in people being over-reliant on their
local emergency rooms for not only their health care, but for relief of other social problems.
These factors create barriers to effective health care. Third, many low-income patients often
don’t have the money to pay for follow-up care post-discharge.147 MedPAC has noted that
mental illness or substance abuse problems may cause low-income patients to leave the hospital
against medical advice (AMA), causing a hospital’s performance to appear worse than the
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national average.148 While patients that are discharged AMA are not included in readmission
rates there are many other social factors that subject low-income patients to readmission.149 For
these reasons, low-income patients are at a high-risk for being readmitted.
Most safety net hospitals have not been able to coordinate post-discharge care with lowincome patients because they have limited resources, small margins and many of their patients
are “high-risk.” While some safety net hospitals do have access to the resources necessary, it
often becomes difficult to identify the patients that are in most need of support.150 Further, some
hospitals may be choosing not to implement processes because the cost of such programs would
be greater than the penalties assessed against them.151
Exacerbating this problem is that hospitals’ readmission rates are compared to a national
readmission rate standard.152 Therefore, as safety net hospitals strive to reduce readmission rates,
so are other hospitals, driving down the national average readmission rate. Safety net hospitals
may be chasing an unobtainable goal. The fact that hospitals’ expected readmission ratio and
actual readmission rates are published on yearly, not a quarterly, basis further complicates the
decision making process.153 Hospitals only have access to their own facility’s patient claims data
for the prior twelve months and cannot estimate how much the national average will drop. 154 The
substantial start-up cost of implementing readmission reduction processes and the unknown
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predictability of the national readmission rate may prohibit safety net hospitals from responding
to the HRRP.
Further, safety net hospitals have struggled in the past to effectively manage postdischarge care, and few proven methods exist for these hospitals.155 However, the CMS asserts
that safety-net hospitals with limited finances can reduce readmissions, citing Denver Health
Medical Center as an example.156 Therefore, CMS does not and will not consider socioeconomic
status of patients when determining an expected readmission rate for safety net hospitals. 157
New Jersey hospitals’ patient demographics vary across the state but empirical evidence
shows that hospitals with some of the highest percent of low-income inpatients are receiving the
maximum fines.158 For example, Jersey City Medical Center is listed as one of the worst in the
nation for readmissions and is receiving the maximum 2 percent fine this year.159 This is
occurring regardless of the fact that Jersey City Medical Center was able to reduce its HF
readmission rate by over 30 percent from 2008 to 2010.160 A simple observation shows that New
Jersey is way behind the curve in reducing readmission, and, therefore is further away from
being free of fines.
III.

Analysis
CMS believes that readmissions can be prevented by “ensuring patients are clinically

ready at discharge, by reducing the risk of infection, reconciling medications, improving
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communication with community providers participating in transitions of care, educating patients
adequately upon discharge, and assuring patients under follow-up care upon discharge.”161 Faced
with increased penalties under the HRRP, hospitals are reshaping old programs and
implementing new processes during admission, discharge and post-discharge to reduce
readmissions.162 While many hospitals are implementing some or all of CMS’s suggested
methods, attempts to reduce readmission rates have differed from hospital to hospital.163 This
section will first look at the economic analysis that hospitals perform to determine whether any
processes should be implement, then look at what processes have been implemented, and
specifically what hospitals in New Jersey are doing.
a. Should hospitals respond?: A brief economic analysis
Some hospitals lost more than $2 million last year and are facing even bigger fines this
year under the HRRP.164 When the HRRP was first implemented hospitals were faced with the
dilemma of whether reducing readmissions, thereby diminishing a revenue stream, would be a
greater loss than the penalty they faced under the HRRP.165 One economist poses the question as
such: “assuming that hospitals are self-interested operating-margin maximizers and are
strategically forward-looking, does the HRRP policy provide economic incentives for a hospital
to reduce its readmissions?”166 Hospitals have been doing extensive economic analysis to answer
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this question and determine whether it is cost efficient to react to the HRRP or maintain the
status quo.167
A substantial factor in determining whether a hospital will react to the HRRP is
determined by a hospital’s margins.168 Many hospitals were faced by slim margins for Medicare
inpatient care before the looming threat of HRRP penalties.169 In fact, the average hospital
currently only has a 2 percent margin for Medicare inpatient care.170 However, some hospitals
will not be as affected by the HRRP and may choose not to respond because they “(i) are located
in sparsely served areas, (ii) have a low fraction of revenue coming from Medicare, (iii) have
currently high readmission rates, or (iv) have a high contribution margin per patient.”171
Hospitals’ reactions to the HRRP will occur along a spectrum, from the “wait and see” to the
aggressive implementation and renovation of processes.172 From a purely economic perspective,
hospitals must look at “the savings in penalty, the loss in contribution, and the cost of reducing
readmissions.”173
The behavioral change of a hospital is related to its fixed costs. A hospital may not
change its processes even if a substantial portion of its margins are reduced by readmission
penalties if the fixed costs for implementing processes to reduce readmission are high.174
Hospitals will begin to respond to the HRRP once the penalty is greater than those fixed costs.175
The fixed cost hurdle may be lowered by developing methods which not only respond to
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readmission rates but that also comply with other PPACA provisions.176 For example, the
Accountable Care Collaborative has been able to jointly reduce readmissions and emergency
room visit rates by creating processes that integrate services.177
When first suggesting readmission reduction legislation, MedPAC believed that a
financial penalty-only approach would cause “structural changes in the health care delivery
system.”178 MedPAC was right. After first year reimbursement reductions were assessed, many
hospitals realized they are facing substantial penalties until they change their practice patterns.
“Hospitals have moved past 'is this for real' or 'should we do something'" and have begun to
implement systems to reduce readmissions. 179 Further, hospitals are not only concerned with the
economic implications of the HRRP but also the overall quality of care. So, without regard to the
economic analysis, many hospitals have begun to respond to the HRRP.
Empirical evidence shows that hospitals are reacting in a variety of ways. Hospital
administrators realize that “[i]t's going to take creativity and innovation and most importantly
reaching outside the hospital walls” to reduce the impact of the HRRP.180 Hospitals have
recognized that the penalties can have substantial impact on Medicare payments and thus have
begun to implement systems to reduce readmission rates.181
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b. Processes Being Implemented
Hospitals are introducing a variety of processes to reduce readmission rates. Some of
these processes start when a patient is first admitted.182 Under this process, hospitals are
identifying patients that are at a high-risk for readmission.183 A patient is identified as being
high-risk for readmission based on their age, chronic condition status, race, socioeconomic status
and English proficiency.184 If a patient is at a high-risk for readmission the hospital may respond
by treating the patient differently to reduce that risk. In fact, Project BOOST (Better Outcomes
by Optimizing Safe Transitions), created by the Society of Hospital Medicine, has created a
patient-specific risk-factor analysis that is to be completed upon admission to identify patients
that are “at increased risk of adverse events post-hospitalization.”185 By identifying high-risk
patients early on, hospitals believe they will reduce their readmission rates.
Also, hospitals are attempting to reduce complications during inpatient stays.186 This
includes performing medication reconciliation. Patients often don’t realize that a prescription
they received in the hospital is duplicative of a medication they already are taking.187 Unlike the
past, medication management is not seamless because the admitting physician, discharging
physician and “receiving” physician are not the same individual.188 Further complicating the
process, an individual with comorbidity may be managed not only by a primary care physician
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but also additional specialists.189 Hospitals have identified this silos-within-silos phenomenon as
creating difficulties in the accurate and complete compiling of patients’ medications list.190
Hospitals are attempting to reduce these difficulties by reaching outside their walls for help.
Hospitals also have been attempting to provide better transition planning by increasing
and improving communication with post care providers. Hospitals that have a highly integrated
medical system, like Denver Health Medical Center, are easily able to perform medication
reconciliation and provide other services subsequent to discharge. Hospitals have also revamped
their discharge procedures to make sure that patients are better educated about their illness and
medications.191
Hospital readmission reduction tactics do not end once a patient has been discharged.192
Many hospitals have started to provide support service and transition care after post-discharge.193
This includes scheduling follow-up visits, proving transportation and assigning case managers
for those with comorbidities or complex cases.194 Hospitals believe that increased coordination
with transition care providers will ensure that patients are receiving the level of care necessary to
prevent readmission.195
Some hospitals are taking the extra steps to ensure that a patient gets follow-up care
within a week after leaving the hospitals.196 This even includes calling the patient within hours of
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discharge to ensure they have the support and/or resources necessary to get care. 197 Hospitals are
getting creative with the programs they are implementing. For example, Del E. Webb Medical
Center, in Sun City, Arizona, has started to give bathroom scales and notepads to patients with
congestive heart failure in order to record small amounts of weight gain, an indicator that a
patient is retaining water because their heart isn’t pumping adequately.198 Other hospitals are
implementing more expensive telemedicine home monitoring programs to reduce readmission,
whereby health data is sent to nurses in real-time in order to prevent unplanned readmissions.199
So from the simple to the complex, the cheap to the expensive, hospitals across the country are
showing that they are willing to do anything to see smaller penalties under the HRRP.
c. New Jersey Hospital’s Response
New Jersey hospitals have been implementing programs to reduce readmission rates in
order to lower the penalty imposed by the HRRP. Specifically, a “readmissions collaborative”
was assembled by the New Jersey Hospital Association (NJHA).200 The collaborative brings
together hospitals, nursing homes, home health care, and hospice providers with the realization
that it takes “an entire community to reduce readmissions.”201 The NJHA realizes that reducing
readmission rates is really only piece of the puzzle to reducing Medicare costs.202 NJHA fully
expects payment reductions or sanctions to be implemented for nursing homes and other
providers.203 Thus, this collaboration was formed with that possibility in mind.
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Providers have focused on the relationship between hospitals and nursing homes as a
potential key to improving hospital readmission rates.204 Essentially, hospitals want to be
reassured that discharged patients sent to skilled nursing facilities are receiving the care they
need. This means ensuring that skilled nursing facilities have the staff and skill set to prevent
readmissions.205 Hospitals have also begun to communicate with outside providers in advance of
discharge to ensure that follow-up care is arranged specific to the particular patient’s needs.206 In
some instances, hospitals are contacting local pharmacists that manage patients’ medication.207
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has awarded nine grants in New Jersey to study
effective ways to reduce readmissions.208 Two successful programs have emerged. In one of the
programs the hospital sends a “coach” to visit newly discharged patients.209 The coach ensures
that the patient is adhering to all discharge instructions and closely monitors the patient.210
The other successful program implemented intensive case management for low-income
patients suffering from multiple chronic conditions.211 This program directly targets patients who
are at a high-risk of readmission.212 Under the case management model, the most crucial step is
getting to the root cause of why a patient does not have a primary care physician.213 Often the
answer was cost.214 Jersey City Medical Center has taken a different approach. Jersey City
Medical Center has focused on “enhanced assessment” of the cause behind the readmission.
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Regardless of the method used, the ultimate goal is to ensure that quality care is being provided
at a lower cost. Several hospitals are attempting to implement programs to ensure that their
facility is not subject to higher rates.
IV.

Redefining the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
There are many critics of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program as it currently

stands. Critics cite to the unintended consequences such as the heavy burden placed on safety net
hospitals and how it may affect care for vulnerable populations.215 One study found that safety
net hospitals are 30 percent more likely to have a readmission rates above the national
average.216 However, there are opponents to redefining the HRRP to account for the burden on
safety net hospitals.217 Supporters of the HRRP, as it current stands, argue that allowing a
patients’ socioeconomic status to be considered would allow hospitals that serve a high
proportion of vulnerable patients to be held to a lower standard of quality of care.218 Ultimately,
there are two areas of focus on how to redefine the HRRP to prevent unintended consequences.
The first option is include socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, community factors, and/or
English as a primary language when determining a hospitals’ risk adjusted readmission rate. The
second option is to change the comparison model from a national standard to a peer review
standard. This note concludes by analyzing both options.
a. Option One: Redefining the Risk Adjustment
Is HRRP working to reduce readmissions? Yes. Statistical evidence proves that from
2007 to 2011 readmission rates remained constant but after the HRRP was implemented rates
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began to fall.219 In fact rates fell from 19 percent to 18.5 percent and eighteen 18 percent in 2012
and 2013, respectively.220 However, even though readmission rates are dropping, this does not
mean the currently accepted methodology used to calculate the penalty is making the appropriate
risk adjustments for setting a national readmission benchmark. For this reason, safety net
hospitals are calling for the risk adjustment to be redefined.221
Many hospitals have been hypercritical of the readmission measures that CMS
adopted.222 One of the biggest critiques is that the current risk adjustment does not take into
account the socioeconomic status of patients.223 Independent research has proven that those with
lower socioeconomic status lack health care resources, such as a primary care physician, money
for follow-up care, and a general understanding of their illness.224
The CMS conceded in its FY 2012 IPPS Final Rule that socioeconomic status may need
to be included as one of the factors in the risk adjustment.225 However, CMS ultimately asserts
that implementing such a policy would allow hospitals to be held to different standards and may
allow for disparities in care for the disadvantaged.226 In Contrast, MedPAC’s June 2013 report
suggests that CMS take into account the socioeconomic status of hospitals’ patients.227 Further
studies show that readmission rates are not only correlated to patients’ socioeconomic status but
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also to race, housing stability, social support, and community resources, and access to timely
primary care resources.228
While CMS cites to Denver Health as an example of a safety net hospital with a low
readmission rate it ignores the reality that such a highly integrated system is not easily or cheaply
implemented.229 Further, safety net hospitals are not only hit more frequently, but because a large
percentage of their revenue often consists of Medicare DRG payments, they are hit with larger
fines. Further, the concern that taking socioeconomic status into account will mask disparities in
care for disadvantaged populations is unsupported.
Redefining the Risk Adjustment Factor to include socioeconomic status could comport
with the statute as written and would require not action by Congress.230 Since the risk adjusted
readmission ratio must only be endorsed by the NQF CMs could propose, through rule making,
that the Risk Adjustment Factor be redefined.231 CMS should take this step and unburden safety
net hospitals by altering the Risk Adjustment Factor to include socioeconomic status while
observing hospital actions to ensure that disparities in care do not arise.
b. Option Two: Peer-Based Evaluation to Replace National Standard
Safety net hospitals patients are more vulnerable to readmission because of their higher
rates of chronic health problems, disability, mental illness, substance abuse and person and social
problems, such as homelessness, unsafe housing, and unstable employment.232 A peer based
evaluation rather than a national standard would recognize this burden. For this reason, MedPAC
228
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suggests that hospitals with high shares of low-income patients be compared to hospitals with a
similar patient mix for purposes of calculating the penalty assessed against a hospital.233
The risk adjustment would not be altered to include socioeconomic status using this
methodology.234 Under this option, CMS would still report readmission rates without regard for
income, making disparities in quality of care easily identifiable, while separately assessing a
financial penalty that took into account the hospitals’ patient mix.235 This would reduce
disparities in the penalties being assessed at safety net hospitals and non-safety net hospitals.236
Under this methodology, potential disparities would not be masked, which was an issue raised by
opponents to Option One, discussed supra.237
Through this peer evaluation method, safety net hospitals may face reduced penalties.
This would allow safety net hospitals to have more resources to address excessive readmission
rates. A pure economic analysis shows this may create a disincentive to implementing
readmission reduction processes, i.e. when the cost of implementing process is greater than the
lowered penalty. However, it is important to remember that many safety net hospitals’ end game
is not profit maximization but rather the delivery of quality care.238 In fact, many hospitals, such
as Jersey City Medical Center, are trying to reduce readmission for all patients, not just patients
for which the hospitals faces a penalty because their primary concern is the quality of care its
patients receive.239 MedPAC’s suggested peer evaluation standard could comport with the
legislation as written, requiring no action from Congress for the same reason Option One is
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allowable, i.e. the methodology only need to be endorsed by the entity under contract (currently
the NQF).240
MedPAC’s 2013 Report to Congress simulated computation of readmission penalties
based on peer evaluation using a hospital’s share of SSI patients to categorize peer groups.241
MedPAC believe that “using SSI categories to compute penalties eliminates most of the”
disparities that exist in penalties assessed to safety net versus non-safety net hospitals.242
MedPAC admits then even under an SSI categorization methodology that hospitals with the
highest share of poor patient still have higher average penalties. 243 However, under the proposed
peer evaluation methodology the disparity between safety net hospitals and non-safety net
hospitals is greatly reduced.244 So, while a peer evaluation system is not perfect it may be a move
in the correct direction.
Conclusion
A general observation shows that many hospitals are reacting to the Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program. Further analysis shows that the Hospitals Readmissions
Reduction Program is in fact reducing readmissions, as rates have fallen slightly over the last two
years. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Hospital Readmissions Reduction
Program as it stands is a total success. Many providers continue to criticize the HRRP for the
unfair burden it places on safety net hospitals. MedPAC and hospitals are calling for policy
decisions to be altered to reduce this burden. As the HRRP moves forward and continues to
expand the penalty percentage as well as applicable conditions, CMS must continue to monitor
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the measures and seriously consider altering the Risk Adjustment Factor to include
socioeconomic status and/or move away from a national standard to a peer evaluation standard.

